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1 
REFLAGGING A VESSEL IN THE EUROPEAN 
MARKET AND DEALING WITH TRANSNATIONAL 
COLLECTIVE DISPUTES: ITF & FINNISH  
SEAMEN’S UNION V. VIKING LINE  
Patrick Chaumette* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the rulings were even handed down by the Court of Justice of 
the European Community (ECJ) in December of 2007, much ink had 
flowed on the subject of the Viking Line and Laval & Partnery 
judgments.1  The conclusions delivered by Advocates General Poiares 
Maduro and Paolo Mengozzi, together with the Court’s judgments,2 
subsequently gave rise to numerous commentaries in European Union 
(EU) Member States.  These rulings interested a wide range of legal 
scholars and experts in international law and labor law, as well as 
                                            
* Professor at the University of Nantes Center of Maritime and Ocean Law, 
Associate Member of Law and Social Change.  This article was translated from its 
original French by Janet Heard-Carnot.  
 1. See Kerstin Ahlberg, Niklas Bruun & Jonas Malmberg, The Vaxholm Case from a 
Swedish and European Perspective, 12 TRANSFER 155 (2006); Thomas Blanke, The 
Viking Case, 12 TRANSFER 251 (2006); Tania Novitz, The Right to Strike and Re-flagging 
in the European Union: Free Movement Provisions and Human Rights, 33 LLOYD’S 
MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY [LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L. Q.] 242 (2006) 
(Gr. Brit.); Giovanni Orlandini, Diritto di Sciopero, Azioni Collettive Transnazionali e 
Mercato Interno dei Servizi : Nuovi Dilemmi e Nuovi Scenari per il Diritto Sociale 
Europeo, 45 WORKING PAPERS CENTRO STUDI DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO EUROPO 
“MASSIMO D’ANTONA” [WP C.S.D.L.E.] (2006) (Italy); BRIAN BERCUSSON, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 40-45 
(ETUI-REHS, Brussels) (2007); Brian Bercusson, The Trade Union Movement and the 
European Union: Judgment Day, 13 EUR. L.J. 279 (2007); Mikaela Bjorkholm, 
Safeguarding EC Fundamental Freedoms: Are Ship Blockades Exempt from the Freedom 
of Movement Rules?, 25 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 103 (2007) (Fr.).  
 2. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. 
I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, 
2007 E.C.R. I-11767. 
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workers, employers, and professionals in the European Community.  
Fierce debate sparked when those close to the jurisdiction explained that 
these classic decisions could not be otherwise, even though the decisions 
were not in line with the conclusions of the two advocates generals.  
However, if it is true that these decisions could not have any other 
outcome, why did the European Parliament issue a report,3 and why was 
there a state of turmoil at the International Labour Organization in 
Geneva?  
The proximity of the two judgments shows the similarity of themes 
related to the international mobility of undertakings and of workers.  The 
Viking Line case concerned ferries crossing the Baltic Sea, the reflagging 
of a vessel, and companies’ freedom of establishment in the Common 
Market.  A Finnish ship-owner, who was losing money on his ferry line 
between Finland and Estonia, wanted to register his ferryboat “The 
Rosella” in Estonia to take advantage of a cheaper Estonian crew.  The 
Finnish Seamen’s Association and the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) campaigned to ensure that the Estonian Seamen’s 
Union would not sign a collective agreement.  ITF also sought assurance 
that if “The Rosella” was reflagged, the ship-owner would comply with 
Finnish law and would keep the existing crew.  Confronted by this 
industrial action, the ship-owner began legal proceedings in London to 
prohibit ITF and its  subsidiary  from hindering the ferry’s reflagging.  
The Court of Appeals in London referred the case to the ECJ for 
preliminary issues of interpretation.  
In the Laval & Partnery case, a Latvian company, “Laval,” won a 
contract to renovate a school building in Sweden.  Laval intended to 
subcontract part of the work to its Swedish subsidiary, “Baltic Bygg,” 
using posted workers.  The case hinged on businesses’ freedom to 
provide services within the Common Market.  When negotiations 
between Laval and the Swedish trade union broke down, the unions 
blockaded the building site in an attempt to force the Latvian undertaking 
into signing the Swedish collective agreement for building trades and 
public works.  Was this obstructive action on the worksite compatible 
with directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
December 16, 1996 on the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services,4 and with the principle of non-discrimination?  As 
                                            
 3. Report on Challenges to Collective Agreement in the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. A6-
0370/2008 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
 4. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, 1997 O.J. (L 18) 1-6 (EC). 
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a result of the blockade, Baltic Bygg filed for bankruptcy because it had 
no activity in the country where its headquarters were located.  
In both cases, the national judges questioned who had legal 
jurisdiction over these transnational union actions.  Could a threat of 
collective action in Finland be subject to British law because ITF’s 
headquarters are in London?  Would blocking a Swedish worksite come 
under Swedish law alone?  Furthermore, would the transnational nature 
of collective action conflict with Community Law of the Internal 
Market?  These two cases are also related to the European Union’s 
poorly controlled process of enlargement that took place in 2004 and that 
led to two negative outcomes for referendums in the Netherlands and in 
France in 2005.  
Companies often take advantage of social differentials in terms of 
pay and social protection, either by postings on land in the economic area 
or by reflagging a vessel.  One example is Irish Ferries.  In one instance, 
an Irish company plying a cross-Channel route that flagged its vessels in 
Cyprus fired its Irish seamen and hired seafarers from Baltic countries 
for regular ferry links between Ireland, Wales, and France.  The company 
ultimately complied with the minimum wage in Ireland to put an end to 
the social conflict it had engendered.5  
Allegation of union responsibility due to transnational collective 
actions forced the Court of Justice to make an initial decision about 
jurisdiction, including which judge is competent to hear a case.6  The 
Swedish Seamen’s Union threatened to blockade a Danish vessel in 
Sweden that belonged to a Danish ship-owner, was flagged under the 
international Danish registry, and was manned by cheaper Polish 
seafarers, in order to operate a regular line between Sweden and the 
United Kingdom (U.K.).7  Ship-owners employ rights inherent to 
                                            
 5. Patrick Chaumette, Du portuaire et de la nouvelle bataille du Transmanche. Soeur 
Anne, soeur Anne, ne vois-tu rien venir?, 667 LE DROIT MARITIME FRANCAIS [D.M.F.] 99 
(2006) (Fr.); Patrick Chaumette, Marine marchande, navigations et espaces juridiques, in 
LES TRANSPORTS MARITIMES DANS LA MONDIALISATION 233 (Jacques Guillaume ed., 
L’Harmattan 2008).  
 6. Case C-18/02, Danmarks Rederiforening v. LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 
2004 E.C.R. I-1417; see also Olga Fotinopolou Basurko, Competencia judicial 
internacional en materia de responsabilidad sindical por conflicto entablado frente a 
empresario marítimo - Indicios de debilitamiento del pabellón como referencia para 
vincular el buque a un Estado concreto, 26 REVISTA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 99 (2004) 
(Spain); Patrick Chaumette, Fragment d’un droit des conflits internationaux du travail?, 
3 DROIT SOCIAL 295 (2005); Etienne Pataut, La grève dans les rapports internationaux de 
travail : question de qualification, 3 DROIT SOCIAL 303 (2005). 
 7. See Danmarks Rederiforening, 2004 E.C.R. I-1417.  
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freedom of establishment principles to reduce the cost of social 
contributions by flagging a vessel on the so-called international registry, 
which is adapted to global competition for vessels to be flagged freely, 
even when considering a regular line running geographically between 
Community countries.  Social competition for “low cost” workers seems 
to be boundless.  Legal recourse with respect to the licitness of a threat to 
strike applies to “matters of tort” as governed by Article 5.3 of the 
December 27, 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.8  The 
plaintiff has the option of choosing either the court where the offence 
took place or where the defendant is domiciled.  But where did the 
damage actually take place?  Should the place where the causal event 
occurred have more importance than the place where the harm occurred?  
Damage resulting from a trade union’s industrial action in a Contracting 
State to which a ship registered in another Contracting State sails must 
not necessarily be regarded as occurring in the flag State, with the result 
that the ship-owner can bring an action for damages against that trade 
union in the flag State.  In that case, the place where the event likely to 
give rise to tortious liability for the person responsible for the act could 
only be Sweden, since that is the place where the harmful event 
originated.9  It is for the national court to inquire whether such financial 
loss may be regarded as having arisen at the place where the enterprise is 
established.  In that case, the Danish ship-owner could lay the matter 
before a Danish court to examine the legality of collective actions in 
Sweden.  The territorial nature of the strike is asserted, but not 
exclusively so, meaning that the Court left the national judge with some 
leeway for action.  In the course of that assessment by the national court, 
the flag State, i.e. the State where the ship is registered, must be regarded 
as being only one factor among others that can help determine where the 
harmful event took place.  The nationality of the ship could only play a 
decisive role if the national court reached the conclusion that the damage 
arose on board the Tor Caledonia, in this instance.  In the latter case, the 
flag State must necessarily be regarded as the place where the harmful 
event caused damage.10  
                                            
 8. See Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), Sept. 27, 1968, O.J. L/299/32, 
available at curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm. 
 9. Danmarks Rederiforening, 2004 E.C.R. I-1417 at para. 41. 
 10. Etienne Pataut, Cour de justice des Communautes européennes, 93: 4 REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [R.C.D.I.P.] 791 (2004) (Fr.); Case C-168/02, 
Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, I-6019, para. 44 (“[T]he expression ‘place 
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II. WHAT ARE THE COMMUNITY JURISDICTIONS? 
The Viking Line and Laval & Partnery decisions raised even more 
fundamental issues about which legal system applies for transnational 
collective actions in the European area than did Tor Line.  It was 
conceivable that even the Court of Justice would not be competent.  Just 
like the Social Policy Agreement of April 7, 1992, appended to the 
Maastricht Treaty of the same date, Article 2, Section 6 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of October 2, 1997 excluded the EU’s competence (granted 
by Article 137 of the EC Treaty on pay), the right of association, the 
right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs (meaning respectively 
wages set by employers and workers), union freedoms and rights, and the 
right to collective labor action.11  Neither the Council nor the 
Commission could take measures on these subjects because they fall 
under the jurisdiction of Member States.  This meant that the Court of 
Justice could refer the questions brought before it to national courts 
which would apply national legislation.  
In 1992, the House of Lords took the grounds of the law on 
collective bargaining, making the Swedish collective agreement a form 
of non-binding, gentlemen’s agreement.  Subjected to common law and 
excluded from trade union immunities, this collective contract was 
considered null and void because it was signed under constraint.12  As a 
result of boycott action while the vessel was in a Swedish port, the owner 
of a Panamanian vessel signed contracts with its Greek and Filipino 
seafarers, compliant with ITF standards, and then sued ITF in the British 
courts to recover the sums.13  According to the House of Lords, British 
courts were competent to rule on a lawsuit of this type, because the 
collective agreement is governed by British law, which was the 
collective autonomy law explicitly chosen by the contracting parties.14  
Furthermore, ITF’s headquarters are in London.  Although the conflict 
                                                                                                  
where the harmful event occurred’ does not refer to the place where the claimaint is 
domiciled or where ‘his assets are concentrated’ by reason only of the fact that he has 
suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of a part of his assets which arose 
and was incurred in another Contracting State.”). 
 11. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Article 137(5), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN. 
003301.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (“The provisions of this article shall not apply to 
pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.”).  
 12. See Dimskal Shipping v. International Transport Workers’ Federation (The “Evia 
Luck” (No. 2)), [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 115 (H.L.). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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took place in Sweden and this boycott was legal under Swedish law, the 
agreement was null and void under common law; the ship-owner could 
claim to have the sums paid to ITF under constraint returned.15  
According to the British judge, the Swedish collective dispute and the 
British collective bargaining agreement (which was the outcome of the 
dispute) had to be considered separately.16   
In conclusion, the nullity of the contract signed incurred the liability 
of the international union behind the licit collective conflict in Sweden.17  
Although the application of British common law was not to the liking of 
the Finnish Seamen’s Union with respect to Viking Line, contrary to 
Finnish law, applying Swedish law made the boycott of the school 
building worksite legal and required compliance with conventional 
wages by the Swedish unions in the Laval & Partnery case.  
Transnational collective disputes would thus fall under the patchwork of 
national legislations, depending on the connections between the place 
where collective action took place and the headquarters of the entities 
involved.18  
III. INTERNAL MARKET LAW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE LACK OF 
COMMUNITY JURISDICTION 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities acts as a 
Constitutional court.  It can take action in matters where the Council of 
the European Union and the European Commission do not have 
competence.  This seems obvious once economic freedoms, freedom of 
establishment for undertakings, or free movement of workers are or may 
                                            
 15. PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 495 (Oxford 
University Press 2d ed. 2007); Keith Ewing, British Labour Law and Private 
International Law Report, in 13 CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE: A 
LEGAL CHALLENGE - A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE 
ACTIONS FROM A LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 226 
(Filip Dorssemont, Teun Jaspers, & Aukje Van Hoek eds., 2007). 
 16. See Dimskal Shipping, 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 115 (H.L.). 
 17. Patrick Chaumette, Les actions collectives syndicales dans le maillage des libertés 
communautaires des entreprises, 2 DROIT SOCIAL 210 (2008).  
 18. See Filip Dorssemont, Labor Law Issues of Transnational Collective Action – 
Comparative Report, in 13 CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE: A LEGAL 
CHALLENGE - A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
FROM A LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 245 (Filip 
Dorssemont, Teun Jaspers, & Aukje Van Hoek eds., 2007). 
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be challenged.19  The social aims pursued by the European Community 
are part of creating the Internal Market, where social rules are designed 
to guarantee workers’ rights and make conditions for competition more 
equal.  This dual objective was likewise that of the International Labour 
Organization as of 1919.  The preamble to the Treaty of Versailles of 
June 28, 1919 states that universal peace can be established only if it is 
based upon social justice, and that failure of any nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labor is an obstacle impeding other nations that desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries. Internal Market law is 
formed by EC law on competition, free movement of goods, people, 
services, and capital. The general impression has been that Community 
social law tends to be absorbed into the general aim of the Internal 
Market’s operation.20  Only the principles of non-discrimination, gender 
equality for employment, and protection of health and safety at work 
clearly emphasize the protection of people’s fundamental rights.  The 
progressive emergence of European citizenship does not disconnect EC 
law from economics, even when it lends a non-utilitarian dimension to 
the freedom of movement of individuals.21  
Consequently, economic freedom and social rights must be 
reconciled.  The Court of Justice recalled that Articles 39 EC on the 
freedom of movement for workers, 43 EC on the right of establishment, 
and 49 EC on the freedom to provide services do not only regulate the 
action of public authorities, but also extend to regulations of another type 
that aim to collectively regulate salaried employment, independent 
employment, and provision of services.  Collective actions by trade 
unions theoretically fall under the scope of application of Article 43 EC.  
In the Schmidberger and Omega rulings, the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities judged that exercising the fundamental rights in 
question—freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and respect for 
human dignity—did indeed fall within the scope of application of the 
Treaty’s provisions.  The Court considered that this exercise should be 
reconciled with requirements related to the rights protected by the Treaty 
of Freedom of Movement of Goods and Freedom of Provision of 
                                            
 19. PIERRE RODIÈRE, DROIT SOCIAL DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 48-49, 448-52 (LGDJ, 
3d ed. 2008).  
 20. LAETITIA DRIGUEZ, DROIT SOCIAL ET DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE 41-42 (Bruylant 
2006). 
 21. SANDRINE MAILLARD, L’ÉMERGENCE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ SOCIALE EUROPÉENNE 
155-82 (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille - Puam 2008). 
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Services, as well as complying with the principle of proportionality.22  In 
regard to the collective bargaining agreements concerning labor and 
management, social policy objectives should not be considered as falling 
under Article 81, Section 1 of the Treaty, which prohibits agreements 
restricting competition.  Further, Article 81, Section 1 does not cover the 
Community law on competition,23 and it is impossible to transpose this 
reasoning to the fundamental freedoms set out in Title III of the 
aforementioned Treaty.  Flagging of a vessel is indivisible from 
exercising freedom of establishment when the vessel in question 
provides the instrument to exercise an economic activity, set up in a 
stable manner in a Member State of registration.24  Article 43 asserts the 
freedom of establishment and may be directly relied upon by a private 
undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions, even 
though Finnish law gives unions the right to take collective action.25  
Marc Fallon has noted that it is not surprising that workers’ social 
rights be addressed from the angle of economic freedoms of 
entrepreneurs.  This approach has come from the decisions in the Rush 
Portuguesa and Vander Elst cases, which address freedom of service 
provisions by employers that enable an extension of freedom of 
movement for posted workers.26  Therefore, it must be verified whether 
the application of a regulation from national law, in this case, dealing 
with the right to collective action by workers and their trade unions, 
constituting an ordinarily forbidden curb on functioning of the Internal 
                                            
 22. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, 
2003 E.C.R. I-5659; Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-
GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609; LAETITIA 
DRIGUEZ, supra note 20, at 39-41, 765-68.  
 23. Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751; Daniel Gadbin, Les fonds de pension obligatoires 
face au droit communautaire de la concurrence : des positions dominantes à préserver 
dans le futur marché intérieur des services financiers, 2 DROIT SOCIAL 178 (2001); 
Christophe Vigneau, De la soustraction des accords collectifs aux règles 
communautaires de la concurrence, J.C.P./La Semaine Juridique 2001-E-1032 (Fr.). 
 24. Case C-221/89, The Queen v. The Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte Factorame 
LTD, 1991 E.C.R. I-3905; Case C-334/94, Commisson v. French Republic, 1996 E.C.R. 
I-1307; DROITS  MARITIMES ¶ 212.11 (Jean-Pierre Beurier, ed., Éditions Dalloz 2006).  
 25. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-
10779, I-10801-I-10802, paras. 61, 63. 
 26. See Marc Fallon, Le détachement européen des travailleurs à la croisée de deux 
logiques conflictualistes, 97: 4 R.C.D.I.P. 781 (2008); Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa 
Lda v. Office National de l’Immigration, 1990 E.C.R. I-1417; Case C-43/93, Raymond 
Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, 1994 E.C.R. I-3803.  
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Market, could be found to be objectively justified and proportional to the 
justification cited.27  
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AS A  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
The collective action taken to implement the policy to combat flags 
of convenience pursued by ITF, which mainly aims to prevent ship-
owners from registering their vessels in a State other than that of which 
the beneficial owners are nationals, should be considered (at the very 
least) as designed to restrict Viking Line exercising its right to free 
establishment.  
The right to take collective action aiming to protect workers 
substantiates a legitimate interest justifying, on principle, the restriction 
of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.  
Additionally, protecting workers is one of the overriding public interest 
reasons already acknowledged by the Court.  Collective actions, like 
collective bargaining and collective agreements, may make up, in the 
specific circumstances of a case, one means for trade unions to protect 
their members’ interests.  The Court of Justice refers to the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights on this point.28  That is why a large 
proportion of legal scholars in France saw these two decisions as 
recognizing social rights, before their analysis of the arbitration led to 
their disappointment regarding this theory.  Since the Community has 
both an economic and a social purpose, the rights ensuing from the 
provisions of the treaty with respect to free movement of goods, people, 
services, and capital must be weighed in balance with the social policy 
objectives pursued.  Amongst the latter are notably (as per Article 136, 
paragraph 1, EC) improved living and working conditions, so as to make 
possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained; 
proper social protection; and dialogue between management and labor.  
If trade union actions intended to ensure a collective work agreement 
with an undertaking established in another Member State constitute a 
restriction for freedom of establishment, that restriction may, in 
principle, be justified by public interest, such as the protection of 
workers, but only if it is established that the restriction is suited to attain 
                                            
 27. Pierre Rodière, Les arrêts Viking et Laval, le droit de grève et le droit de 
négociation collective, 44: 1 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [R.T.D. Eur.] 
47 (2008) (Fr.).  
 28. See National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) 
(1975); Wilson, National Union of Journalists, and Others v. United Kingdom, 2002-V 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 534. 
10 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is needed 
to achieve that objective.29  
V. COLLECTIVE ACTION AS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON 
The Court of Justice left it to the British courts to determine whether 
the aims pursued by the trade unions, through the collective action taken, 
concerned the protection of workers. Were jobs or working conditions 
aboard the Rosella ferryboat jeopardized or seriously threatened?  This 
would not be the case if the ship-owner had undertaken to avoid ending 
the lasting employment of all crew members due to the reflagging, if this 
commitment’s scope was as binding as the stipulations of a collective 
agreement, if it guaranteed workers compliance with legal provisions, 
and if the provisions of the collective agreement governing their working 
relations were to be maintained.  The court the case was referred to had 
to verify whether the collective union action was appropriate to 
guarantee reaching the goal set, i.e. maintaining jobs and working 
conditions, and did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve this 
objective.  Did not the trade union have other means at its disposal which 
were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring 
collective negotiations to a successful conclusion?  Had that trade union 
exhausted those means before initiating such action under the applicable 
national rules and collective agreement law?30  
The British judge did not intervene, since an agreement was struck 
between ITF and Viking Line to put an end to the dispute.  As seen from 
the United Kingdom, this decision was certainly an advance, explaining 
the relief of David Cockroft, ITF Secretary General, who stated: “We 
welcome the Court’s assertion that the right to take collective action - 
including the right to strike - is a fundamental right . . . .”31  However, 
the ruling challenges the very idea of combating the use of flags of 
convenience, led by ITF since 1948 and based on registry of a vessel in a 
State other than that of which the beneficial owners are nationals. The 
statutes of ITF require it, when asked by one of its members, to initiate 
solidarity action against the beneficial owner of a vessel which is 
registered in a State other than that of which that owner is a national.  
Whether or not that owner’s exercise of its right of freedom of 
                                            
 29. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 at I-10838, para. 90. 
 30. Id. at I-10837, para. 87. 
 31. International Transport Workers’ Federation, ITF welcomes court assertion on the 
right to take collective action, http://www.itfglobal.org/news-
online/index.cfm/newsdetail/1705 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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establishment is liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions 
of employment of its employees was not an issue.  The Court of Justice 
imposes this in the frame of Community market law.  Can ITF continue 
to reserve the right to collectively negotiate for trade unions of seafarers 
in the State where the beneficial owner is a national,32 when freedom of 
establishment alters the conditions under which vessels are operated, 
particularly on regular lines, when the ship-owner’s functions are 
dispersed?  How should the stable establishment for operating a vessel be 
defined in order to restore the substantial link between the vessel and the 
State whose flag it flies?  
Although ITF must certainly adapt its doctrine to the modern 
management methods of global ship-owners whose location cannot be 
limited to the headquarters of the parent company, and whose 
registrations must go beyond the dimension of beneficial ownership, 
developing international collective bargaining should be promoted by 
international, regional, and national organizations, and even by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities.  In terms of pay and social 
protection for seafarers, it is mainly unilateral action by ITF that has 
enabled about fifty-five percent of the modern merchant fleet to be 
covered by collective agreements.  Thus, ship-owners obtain the blue 
ticket, which simplifies shipping and contributes to the seafarers’ 
Welfare Fund.   
ITF inspectors are present in 47 countries.  An International 
Bargaining Forum (IBF) agreement was signed on November 13, 2003 
which significantly changed the way ITF standards will be applied 
aboard vessels.  It is an agreement between ITF and the Joint Negotiating 
Group (JNG) with seventy-five ship owners from the twenty-four 
countries in the International Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC), 
and those of Japan represented by their own association called the 
International Mariners Management Committee of Japan (IMMAJ).33   
                                            
 32. See H.R. NORTHRUP & R.L. ROWAN, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ 
FEDERATION AND FLAG OF CONVENIENCE SHIPPING (Industrial Research Unit, Wharton 
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 33. See International Transport Workers’ Federation, Joint Statement from IBF (10/6), 
http://www.seafarers.org/HeardAtHQ/2005/Q4/ibfstate.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
55,000 seamen from 3200 vessels are covered by the International Bargaining Forum 
agreement drawn up by the ITF and IMEC.  Id.  See also REYNALD BOURQUE, LES 
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Labour Studies, Education Series 2005) (Switz.), available at 
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The ITF collective agreement, which is traditionally accompanied by 
issuance of a blue ticket – certifying that the vessel is covered by a 
classic ITF TCC agreement with an AB seaman’s wage set at $1,400 – 
will remain in effect, but will be replaced whenever possible by the IBF 
agreement which gives the right to a green ticket.  This agreement is the 
outcome of discussion and negotiation over a ten year period.34  
The agreement legitimizes ITF’s action and sets it in the context of 
collective bargaining.  It was noted in 2007, at the International 
Bargaining Forum in London, that the agreement applies to 70,000 
seafarers and 3500 vessels.  The development of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia led to specific negotiation in 2008 in order to double the wages 
in this war-risk area.  
VI. ON REFLAGGING A VESSEL 
Is reflagging a vessel a form of relocation?  What effects does 
reflagging have on seafarers’ contracts of employment or their collective 
agreements?  The question was either not asked, or received a simple and 
obvious response, when Flag State law was the shared law on board, or 
when there was a substantiated link between the State of registry and the 
vessel’s operation on a regularly plied line.  But from now on, the 
question will be raised.  The issue is of particular interest to those 
involved in international law, either in the context of national 
international registries created by various European countries, or within 
the framework of the dispute on maritime employment concerning 
yachting, particularly in the Mediterranean.  
The question of the substantial link between the vessel and maritime 
occupation arises when the ship is registered in a place that may have no 
connection with its operation.  This presents a conflict of jurisdiction, 
and the competent court must be determined.  Can a yacht flagged in 
Luxembourg or Guernsey and used for sailing in the Mediterranean lead 
to the court of the place of the managing firm of the seafarer’s employer 
when the contract was signed in a recruiting firm or manning agency in 
another place?  Vessels are made to sail, and the administrative home 
                                                                                                  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dp16105.pdf; 
Nathan Lillie, Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience Shipping, 42: 1 
BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47 (March 2004); Nathan Lillie, Union 
Networks and Global Unionism in Maritime Shipping, 60: 1 RELATIONS 
INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 88 (2005) (Can.). 
 34. James Smith, Le Passage du Blue Ticket au Green Ticket, 22 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT 
MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 265 (2004).  
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port is often entirely different from its actual home port.  Council 
Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of December 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters is currently being interpreted.35  
The usual place of work is where the employee habitually carries 
out most of his/her working time on behalf of the employer, 
taking account of the worker’s entire period of activity.  In the 
case of stable periods of work in successive different places, the 
last place of activity should be chosen, when in accordance with 
the clear will of the parties, it was decided that the worker 
exercised his activities there in a stable and lasting way.36  
For a seafarer, this is no longer the Flag State law.  The industrial 
tribunal in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had questioned the European 
Court of Justice about this very explicitly, but the case was struck off the 
roll.37  This substantial link raises questions about both the conflict of 
jurisdictions and the conflict of laws.  
With respect to the Convention of Rome of June 19, 1980 and the 
conflict of laws, since the vessel is not a territory and since the seafarer 
can carry out his work in the waters or even the harbors of different 
States, for Professor Paul Lagarde, designating the law of the place 
where the work is habitually carried out, i.e. lex laboris, has no possible 
application.38  Marc Fallon shares this analysis, which no longer makes 
Flag State law the common law on board, but rather corresponds to free 
flagging of the vessel.  In regard to private international law, it is not 
certain whether reflagging a vessel will lead to a modification in the law 
applicable to the seafarers’ contracts of employment.  For a regular 
shipping line, Finnish seafarers who are recruited and reside in Finland 
can be considered to carry out their work in that country.39  The flag is a 
choice of commercial, fiscal, and social management.  It can no longer 
be a single indicator of the vessel’s ties.  In the opinion of Horatia Muir-
                                            
 35. Regulation No. 44/2001 (O.J.E.C. 2001 L 12, 1). 
 36. Patrick Chaumette, Quel lieu habituel de travail pour le marin international?, 6 
DROIT SOCIAL 733 (2009). 
 37. Case C-413/07, Haase v. Superfast Ferries SA, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:051:0040:0040:EN:pdf; OLGA 
FOTINOPOULOU BASURKO, EL PROCESO LABORAL INTERNACIONAL EN EL DERECHO 
COMUNITARIO 128 (CES de Andalucía, Sevilla 2008). 
 38. Paul Lagarde, A propos de la loi française n° 2005-412 du 3 mai 2005 créant le 
registre international français (RIF) des navires, 94: 3 R.C.D.I.P. 527 (2005). 
 39. Marc Fallon, Le détachement européen des travailleurs à la croisée de deux 
logiques conflictualistes, 97: 4 R.C.D.I.P. 781 (2008). 
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Watt, the flag is not transparent: in the case of reflagging, Estonian law 
(which is the law of the new establishment and affords less protection) 
thus becomes applicable in the future to individual relations of labor 
disputes.40  
Is it therefore necessary to have recourse to the Convention of Rome 
rule of subsidiarity, which invokes the law of the country of the 
undertaking that hired the worker (Article 6-2-b) (the lex loci contractus) 
unless what arises from a series of circumstances is that the employment 
contract shows closer ties with another country, in which case the law of 
the other country will apply.41  Article 8 of Regulation 593/2008 of June 
17, 2008, called Rome I on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 
refers to the place from which the employee habitually carries out his 
work in performance of the contract.  This Regulation concerns contracts 
drawn up after it entered into force on December 17, 2009.  Is the actual 
home port the vessel and its place of administrative registry, the 
headquarters of the management firm, or rather the material conditions of 
operation of the vessel?  Maritime law appears to be undergoing a major 
overhaul in view of freedom of vessel flagging, which puts national 
social frameworks into competition.  
VII. THE NEGATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING? 
The European paradox is that the European Court of Justice denies 
any role of collective bargaining in its ruling on Laval & Partnery.  The 
collective action taken by Swedish trade unions was compliant with 
Swedish law, but had a transnational impact.  The employer’s freedom of 
service provision and the workers’ social rights must be reconciled.  
Collective action cannot impose any constraints on the employer beyond 
the applicable Community directive.  
Directive 96/71/EC concerning posting of workers provides that 
guaranteed working conditions for posted workers in the host Member 
State are laid down by law, regulation, or administrative provision, 
and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been 
declared universally applicable.42  Collective agreements and arbitration 
                                            
 40. Horatia Muir-Watt, ECJ February 5, 2004, DFDS Tor Line, Case C-18/02,  93: 2 
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 41. Olga Fotinopoulou Basurko, Reflexiones acerca de la Ley del Pabellón como 
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awards for the purposes of that provision are those which must be 
observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the 
profession or industry concerned.43  Application of collective agreements 
to undertakings that post workers should guarantee equality of treatment 
between the latter undertakings and national undertakings in the similarly 
positioned profession or industry concerned.  The host State can only 
impose compliance with its regulations if the salaried employees do not 
already benefit from an essentially similar protection under legislation 
that mainly applies to them.  The application of standards in force in the 
host State gives them a true advantage which significantly contributes to 
their social protection, and provides that the application of these 
standards is proportional to the common objective.  
The Swedish law on posting of workers specifies the working and 
employment conditions related to matters set out in directive 96/71/EC, 
with the exception of minimum wage rates.44  The law says nothing about 
pay, which is traditionally determined in Sweden through collective 
bargaining between workers and employers.  The Swedish system gives 
trade union organizations the right to resort to collective action under 
certain conditions, in order to compel an employer to begin pay 
negotiations or sign a collective agreement.  In the case of construction 
companies, this sort of system involves a case-by-case negotiation on the 
worksite, taking account of the skills, qualifications, and duties of the 
salaried employees in question.  In practice, since employees belong to 
trade unions, employers comply with the collective agreements when 
unions ask them to avoid a collective dispute or effective obstruction, 
and the public authorities have not had to render these collective 
agreements compulsory.  The Court of Justice therefore considered that 
they are not part of the state-based law where employees are posted.45  In 
a way, Scandinavian laws may need a procedure of extension by 
                                                                                                  
la Tutela dei Lavoratori di Fronte alla Libertà di Prestazione dei Servizi Nella CE, 49 
WP C.S.D.L.E. 92 (2006) (Italy). 
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 44. EMIRE Database (European Industrial Relations Glossaries), Sweden – Posting of 
Workers, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SWEDEN/ANCHOR-UTSTATIONER 
INGAVARBETSTAGARE-SE.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 45. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, 
2007 E.C.R. I-11767.  
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ministerial or royal order, as in France or Belgium.  The ECJ does not 
challenge national law concerning strictly national situations, but it 
destabilized Swedish law as confronted with the Community market and 
transnational situations.  The Swedish law of 1991 called Lex 
Britannia,46 which does not take collective agreements signed abroad into 
account and which was validated by the ILO’s expert committee upon a 
claim by Swedish ship-owners,47 is discriminatory when the collective 
agreement in question has been signed in a Member State of the 
European Union.  Swedish law should impose the same obligation of 
social peace with respect to both Swedish collective agreements and 
foreign collective agreements.  Community jurisprudence thus promotes 
social dumping, since recognizing foreign collective agreements is not 
enough to prohibit professional claims or collective action aiming to 
extend collective agreements in the State of posting.  
Collective action cannot be justified in light of the public interest 
objective of protecting workers.  This is particularly true where the 
negotiations on pay, which collective action seeks to require an 
undertaking established in another Member State to enter into, form part 
of a national context characterized by a lack of provisions of any kind 
that are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it 
impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to 
determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards 
minimum pay.48  Collective bargaining must concern precise and 
accessible provisions, and the requirement of compliance with wages 
agreed upon in Sweden was not sufficiently precise for the Latvian 
undertaking.  Consequently, the collective action is limited to 
                                            
 46. EMIRE Database (European Industrial Relations Glossaries), Sweden – Lex 
Britannia, www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SWEDEN/ANCHOR-LEXBRITANNIA-
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 47. Patrick Chaumette, Le classement sans suite de la plainte des armateurs suédois 
contre leur gouvernement, D.M.F. 830 (1995).  
 48. Id. 
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compliance with compulsory state law, the statute law determined by the 
directive 96/71.  Transnational collective action is prohibited in view of 
claims exceeding this statute law, which is the negation of the normative 
autonomy of workers and employers.49  
VIII. WHAT WERE THE REACTIONS? 
On April 3, 2008, the Commission published a statement which 
clearly states that they will continue to fight social dumping and that the 
freedom to provide services is in no way superior to, nor does it oppose, 
the fundamental rights to strike and to belong to a trade union.50  The 
European Parliament adopted the resolution of October 22, 2008 on 
challenges to collective agreements in the EU.51  Article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice in 
December of 2000, codifies the right of collective bargaining and 
collective action.52 All the Member States have ratified the following 
conventions: ILO-87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize; ILO-98 on Right to organize and collective 
bargaining; ILO-117 on Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy 
(especially Part IV); and ILO-154 on collective bargaining.53  Under the 
ILO conventions 87 and 98, restrictions on the right to industrial action 
                                            
 49. See SOPHIE ROBIN-OLIVIER & ETIENNE PATAUT, EUROPE SOCIALE OU EUROPE 
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 51. See Report on Challenges to Collective Agreements in the EU, supra note 3.   
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and fundamental rights can only be justified on grounds of health, public 
order, and other similar factors.  The European Parliament believes that 
the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized in the Member States, in 
ILO Conventions, and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (including the rights to negotiate, conclude, and enforce 
collective agreements, and to take industrial action) cannot be put at risk.  
These judgments do not challenge national laws and case law on 
national collective disputes.  They only concern transnational collective 
disputes with a European Community dimension.  However, it is difficult 
to believe that these two realms of the national and transnational will stay 
sealed off from each other for long.  It is easy to imagine that a national 
judge who applies Community law will not take the ECJ’s rulings into 
account or consult the ECJ on a question of preliminary interpretation, 
but will simply apply his or her national law to transnational collective 
actions.  This approach would not lead to truly consistent justice.  The 
national judge could notably base his decision on the ILO-87 and ILO-98 
conventions that his country has ratified in order to build a different case 
law.54  However, the objective would still be to sway the reasoning of the 
ECJ itself.  
Seeing that the collective autonomy of workers and employers is 
thus negated by the ECJ, could a complaint be filed with the 
International Labour Organization, or more specifically, with the 
Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations?  Since the 
European Union is not a member of the ILO, but simply an observer, it 
does not seem possible that the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) could file a complaint directly.  These complaints would come 
from national trade unions that are members of ETUC, for non-
compliance by the ECJ with conventions ILO-87 and ILO-98, ratified by 
the Member States.  It is not necessary to exhaust national review 
possibilities, even if the Committee on Freedom of Association will take 
this into account.55  Indeed, no judicial review or appeal is available to 
challenge a judgment of the ECJ.  
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The Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, revised in 1996, 
asserts the rights of workers and employers to collective bargaining and 
to collective actions.56  For a long time, the European Court of Human 
Rights based its reasoning on a restrictive interpretation of this Article, 
excluding collective bargaining from the scope of Article 11 of the 1950 
Convention that sanctioned freedom of association and freedom of 
unions.57  Consultation of unions and collective bargaining were simply 
means, amongst others, that States could implement to ensure the 
freedom of unions.  On April 25, 1996, in the case of Gustafsson v. 
Sweden, the European Court accepted the legitimate nature of collective 
bargaining in refusing the right of an employer to avoid the application 
of a collective agreement, even on the grounds of his freedom to not join 
a union.58  The European Court finally admitted that for Turkish civil 
servants, this freedom of association and union freedom contained the 
right to collective bargaining.59  It must be noted that the freedom of 
collective bargaining does not exist without the right to union action.  
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Thus, European jurisprudence with respect to human rights could be 
based on the autonomy of social law, autonomy over which the economic 
jurisprudence of the Community, based on the Internal Market’s 
operation, has ridden roughshod.  It appears that European economic and 
social cohesion must be based on the duality of European jurisdictions, 
and a dialogue between them.  
IX. CONCLUSION: WHY SHOULD THE ECJ’S INTERPRETATION BE 
MODIFIED? 
The autonomy of workers and employers is simply the only good 
way to resolve collective labor disputes.60  Subordinated work, where the 
health and safety of the worker are at stake, and where a worker’s pay 
depends on the labor market, cannot remain within a context of strictly 
individual contracts nor in a legal framework which is purely state 
legislation and regulation-based.  One of the great novelties of social law 
has been to give workers and employers a role in setting standards, 
which has spilled over beyond the field of labor relations into that of 
institutions for social protection.  This collective autonomy has a 
civilizing influence on labor relations.  Denying collective autonomy 
means encouraging social violence.  
This violence, arising from social dumping, became clearly visible 
recently in the case of posted Italian and Portuguese service providers 
used to maintain Total’s refineries in the United Kingdom.61  These were 
not specialized subcontractors with skills that British companies did not 
possess.  They were used as a way of getting around one part of British 
law, and especially collective labor agreements.  This subcontracting 
caused a scandal, coming as it did at a time of financial crisis and rapidly 
rising unemployment, as well as record profits for the global oil 
corporation in question.  Some of the posted employees had to be housed 
on barges.  Since they were not U.K. residents, what social protection 
were they afforded?  Passions ran high and the reactions from the British, 
which seemed to have an anti-foreigner bent, spun out of the unions’ 
control.  Such issues resulted from a shortcoming in Community social 
law, encouragement of social dumping, and workers put into direct 
competition without any attempt to improve productivity or quality of 
service.  In the absence of rules accepted by all, or rules which are 
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negotiated or negotiable, it is a power struggle that prevails, with 
opposition to what is mistakenly identified as the “law” of the market.  
Cross-Channel and cross-Baltic shipping links have shown the necessity 
of both collective bargaining and EC coordination of links between EU 
states.62  
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